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ABSTRACT 
 
Colorado’s constitutional Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR) is a product of the citizen 
initiative process, a mechanism of direct democracy that allows citizens to circumvent 
legislatures and enact laws themselves.  A prominent argument against this process is that 
such a mode of lawmaking can generate conflicts within state constitutions and bring 
about unintended consequences.  This paper considers the Colorado state budget 
difficulties that arose during the 2001 recession, the relationship of TABOR and those 
difficulties, and finds that TABOR resulted in unintended consequences that were 
unforeseen by voters who approved the measure.  Examples of these unanticipated, 
unintended consequences include: significant budget cuts for higher education, reductions 
in state mental health services, and insufficiencies within the TABOR law regarding how 
TABOR refunds were to be made.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview of the 2001-05 Recession 
Proponents of Colorado’s TABOR law laud it as an effective instrument for 
constraining government growth since it links allowable government revenue collection 
with population growth and inflation.  The policy implications of restricting government 
growth in Colorado to such measures were intensely disputed between 2001 and 2005.  
Aggregate state revenue declines, paired with the requirements of Colorado’s numerous 
tax and expenditure limitations (TELs), led to numerous budget complications. 
At the onset, capital projects were halted, hiring for state jobs was sharply 
curtailed, and operational spending was scaled back.   But this was not enough, and as the 
recession worsened, so did the condition of the state budget.  The situation was dire by 
the beginning of the 2002 regular session.   
To further complicate matters, officials could not be sure how long poor 
economic conditions would persist, and no comprehensive fix to the predicament was put 
forth.  Consequently, rather than an intentional, systematic approach, measures to address 
the crisis desperately unfolded in a piecemeal fashion.  For each fiscal year, officials took 
whatever actions were necessary to balance the budget and maintain core operations, 
while, with limited information, also planning for the next fiscal year.  Between FY 
2000-01 and FY 2004-05, the budgets of fifteen departments were reduced.  The most 
substantial budget cuts overall were to Transportation and Human Services, for which 
total funding was reduced by 34.1% and 6.6% respectively.  The greatest proportional 
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reduction in General Fund allocation was for Higher Education, which contributed to 
tuition increases, among other consequences 
 
1.2 Colorado Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Recession 
The citizen initiative process allows citizens to place policy measures on 
electoral ballots for voter consideration which then become law if approved by popular 
vote.  The process is therefore a mechanism of direct democracy since it allows citizens 
to bypass the legislature—a process that is highly controversial.  Most research on the 
subject of direct democracy in the United States has focused generally on the 
implications of the initiative process for public policy, and, within this context, has 
emphasized three subject areas: the use of the process to achieve policy outcomes both 
directly and indirectly; voter competence and the preferences of voters when making such 
policy decisions; and how direct democracy affects the interests of minority groups since 
the process transforms the will of the majority into law. 
Tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) are measures that restrain government 
growth by restricting allowable government revenue collection, spending levels, or both.  
Colorado’s TABOR Amendment, enacted in 1992, is a tax and expenditure limitation that 
originated as a citizen initiative.   State population growth and the inflation rate are the 
two elements of the TABOR formula that dictates how much collected revenue the state 
may retain each year.  In theory, those are the two key factors that are needed in 
determining how much revenue the state needs in order to maintain a “same level of 
services” budget from year to year, which is the source of the notion that the formula 
allows government growth to keep pace with the economy.  
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However, many state departments are caseload driven, and thus their budget 
needs vary with the number of cases.  A common criticism raised in the literature is that 
the budget needs of departments can exceed the allowable TABOR growth limit, which is 
especially important for departments that provide services to vulnerable populations (e.g., 
“State”).  From calendar year 2001-03, the TABOR formula permitted the state 
government to grow by 12.9 percent.  To the extent that some departments of the state 
experienced budget growth rates below 12.9 percent over this period, while 
simultaneously experiencing caseload growth above the growth rate of the general 
population, it is not unreasonable to argue that services delivered to clients or citizens 
were reduced; budget growth rates below 12.9% between 2001 and 2003, coupled with 
increased caseload demand, indicate service reductions (“State” 9). 
 
1.3 Motivation 
Significant aspects of governance and public finance are within the purview of 
TABOR, which, coupled with its exceptional degree of restrictiveness, makes an 
understanding of TABOR’s consequences indispensable.  The central assertion in this 
paper is that Colorado’s TABOR Amendment had unintended consequences that became 
apparent during the recession.  This paper emphasizes the budget cuts made to mental 
health services, higher education.  Also emphasized are ambiguities in the TABOR law 
regarding exact surplus refund mechanisms.   
While there exist numerous studies that offer assessments of TABOR, 
impressions of it remain assorted.  The Cato Institute suggests that all states should adopt 
the Colorado model.  Former Colorado Governor Bill Owens, in a 2003 Wall Street 
Journal editorial, argued that TABOR had been a catalyst of unprecedented growth in the 
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1990s, and that California’s Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, should adopt a similar 
approach to address his state’s deficit (Martell and Teske 673).  In contrast, the Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities suggests that, “What has happened in Colorado should be a 
cautionary tale for any other state considering going down the TABOR path.  Services 
deteriorated to the point at which the quality of life in the state has been undermined, and 
the state’s potential for economic development has been weakened” (Bradley and Lyons).  
During the 2001 recession, twenty-eight states had tax and expenditure limitations, and 
activity in other states suggests that the further enactment of TELs is likely. 
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2. A Survey of Tax and Expenditure Limitations  
 
2.1 Overview of Initiatives, Referenda, and Direct Democracy 
While this paper does not specifically consider the effects of the initiative process 
on minority interests in Colorado, this section is intended to provide a broad overview of 
the general arguments over representative and direct democracy.  Over the course of the 
past two hundred years America has gradually but surely moved towards increased 
democracy, which has occurred through an assortment of movements in advocacy of the 
rights of such disenfranchised populations as women and African Americans.  Despite 
previous advancements of the government, scholars, citizens, and general observers alike 
remain unsettled by many aspects of the current political establishment.  Polls frequently 
reflect that large majorities think the country is “on the wrong track,” despite economic 
success (Haskell 3).  Americans do believe they should be constantly looking over the 
shoulders of elected officials, and, whenever possible should wrest control from 
politicians and decide policy for themselves via initiatives, referenda, or other forms of 
direct democracy (Haskell 6).  
Supportive of this notion is the popularity ballot initiatives to address a host of 
policy areas.  While the legislative process is the most common mode of lawmaking, it is 
not the only one.  The initiative process allows for the placement of a statutory or 
constitutional amendment on the ballot once proponents obtain a specified number of 
signatures while the referendum process involves laws passed by the legislature but on 
which the people must approve for enactment.  Ballot initiatives have resulted in 
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significant policy shifts in such areas as same-sex marriage, health care, euthanasia, land 
conservation, affirmative action, and tax and expenditure limitations.  Initiatives have 
also changed fundamental aspects of the representative democracy system itself by 
bringing about legislative term limits and reforms for campaign financing.  It has largely 
been by this process that the broad enactment of TELs, commonly referred to as the 
modern “tax revolt,” has progressed. 
Attentiveness to tax and expenditure limitations, including Colorado’s TABOR 
Amendment, has recently been heightened due largely to two specific disparities among 
states.  The first relates to long-term growth rates in state revenues and spending.  Some 
states with TELs have limited the expansion of government better than states without, 
and questions on the role of TELs in limiting government expansion in those states have 
given rise to much recent literature.  Second, responses among states to the revenue 
shortfalls that accompanied the national recession that began in 2001 differ significantly. 
Taxes were raised in some states, spending was reduced in others, and some accumulated 
substantial debt.  Consequently, the overall influence of TELs on state responses to 
revenue shortfalls has become of particular interest to researchers (Poulson, “Tax and 
Spending” 1). 
Also of interest are linkages between TELs and democracy since numerous TELs 
have originated via the citizen initiative process, and the exact function of most TELs is 
to mandate direct voter approval for various policy decisions, which invariably curtails 
the authority of elected officials.  Just as the founders were passionate in their advocacy 
of direct and representative democracy, so too are current observers of the political 
system.  Although the notion that ballot initiatives, such as tax and expenditure 
limitations, impact public policy is without question, the appropriateness of passing laws 
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using this method is intensely disputed.  The equivocal point of difficulty from which 
divergent views on democracy derive is how exactly citizens should participate in the 
political process? 
Advocates of direct democracy contend that the allowance of initiatives and 
referenda is especially valuable since these measures provide a type of safety valve for 
the system of representative government in that they can compel policy changes when 
legislatures neglect policy areas.  Although much literature by advocates of the initiative 
process acknowledges that moneyed special interests can, and sometimes do, undermine 
the integrity of the initiative process, much of it suggests that ultimately the process 
provides valuable opportunities for citizen and voter action, and it should remain so.  
Ernst, Larson, and Sabato summarize fundamental arguments by proponents of the 
initiative process and direct democracy who contend that such devices: 
• Convey the popular will directly instead of it being diluted by representative 
politics and special interests; 
• Reduce citizen alienation; 
• Heighten voter awareness of issues; and 
• Eliminate the corruption endemic to the legislative process (31-32). 
Opponents of direct democracy provide a series of criticisms against, of which a 
central point is that initiatives and referenda constitute an unrefined means of legislating 
that yields ultimately piecemeal, poorly formulated law; this consideration is relevant to 
the current argument over constitutional reform in Colorado.  For example, Colorado 
State Senator Abel Tapia, in a recent editorial, explained: “Through the years, 
amendments have tangled our constitution into an excessively detailed document with 
antiquated laws and conflicting provisions that straightjacket and cloud policy.  
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Unintended consequences have plagued the document by which we govern ” (A3). 
According to a statement from the Colorado Municipal League, because it’s just as easy 
to amend Colorado’s constitution as it is to change state law through a ballot issue, the 
state constitution has become a crazy quilt of often conflicting mandates that together 
have unintended consequences (O’Brien). 
Defenders of representative democracy also commonly raise two chief arguments 
in support of the representative democracy system.  First, only representative institutions 
can fill the need for informed deliberation, consensus, and compromise, all of which are 
necessary for governance in the public interest.  The campaign rhetoric used to pass 
referenda and initiatives is inferior to the consideration and compromise afforded by the 
representative democracy system.  
Second, arguments for direct democracy presuppose that the opinion of the 
public has a special character and the majority by right should rule.  Counter to this 
position is the notion that transforming the will of the majority into law can lead to the 
violation of minority rights by majority tyranny (Haskell 11).  James Madison notably 
advocated representative democracy and the importance of institutional checks and 
balances as a means to protect minority interests.  In Federalist No. 51 (Library), 
Madison explained: 
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression 
of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. 
Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united 
by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. 
 
Ernst, Larson, and Sabato explain that the initiative process produces biases 
against individual and minority interests, which is exactly what representative institutions 
and the process of checks and balances were implemented to protect.  And, simply put, 
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legislatures and other representative government institutions promote certain democratic 
opportunities in ways that the initiative process doesn’t, and they allow for a more 
thorough representation of mixed interests (42).  Haskell asserts that the ability of 
minorities to use the legislative process to block popular legislation that they feel is 
threatening can be very frustrating at times.  But liberal democracy is not meant to serve 
only the interests of the majority; it is meant to provide some protection for the rights of 
minorities as well.  The alternative is a strict 50-percent-plus-one majoritarianism that 
runs the risk of leaving vulnerable minorities out in the cold.  When contentious social 
issues come to the fore, plebiscitary politics can be a zero-sum game, and winning a 
majority may involve inflaming the public passions.  The fact is that the values of 
consensus and compromise that are characteristic of representative institutions provide 
very real safeguards against this kind of politics (Haskell 159-60).  Ernst, Larson, and 
Sabato summarize other common criticisms of direct democracy: 
• Moneyed special interests dominate and adulterate the process;  
• Voters lack an appropriate level of understanding of the measures on which they 
vote and the potential unintended consequences of those measures; 
• Initiative constitutional amendments most seriously undermine the system of 
representative democracy since they are rigid in nature, may only be adjusted by 
another constitutional amendment, are not malleable by elected officials; and 
• Initiatives and referendums can fix in place policies contrived by the 
uncertainties of shifting political coalitions (42). 
Despite arguments for and against the use of direct democracy mechanisms, over 
seventy percent of Americans live in a city or state in which the initiative process is 
permitted, and use of the initiative process is widespread.  In comparison to the $700 
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million spent on the closely contested 2004 presidential election campaign, nearly $400 
million was spent on statewide initiative and referendum campaigns in the same year 
(Smith and Tolbert 1).   
 
2.3 Early History of Tax and Expenditure Enactment 
Prior to John Maynard Keynes’ advocacy of government deficits and the 
importance of government spending to overcome the Great Depression, the prevailing, 
established set of attitudes favored government deficits only during times of war, and 
post-war surpluses were typically used to cover the debt incurred during war.  The 
Keynesian revolution has plainly influenced the U.S. as well as other nations, and 
persistent deficits and a growing debt burden have been generally maintained.  Over 
much of the post WWII period, the growth of state and local spending has outdistanced 
the growth of federal spending (Poulson, “Colorado’s” 1).  Frequently, following 
recessions states have raised taxes in order to compensate for revenue shortfalls, and 
when state economies recover, those higher taxes have tended to lead to higher state 
revenue collection and spending relative to state income. 
The 1970s was a period marked by especially high inflation in California, and the 
method of raising taxes to overcome revenue shortfalls came to the forefront.  While 
what is commonly alluded to as the modern “tax revolt” did not necessarily originate in 
California, the movement was greatly accelerated largely due to political activity in the 
state during the 1970s.  On March 13, 1973, then-Governor Ronald Reagan offered 
Proposition 1 to the California state legislature, the first tax and spending limit submitted 
in state government.  While Proposition 1 failed to pass, it popularized the concept of a 
tax and spending limit as a means to restrict government growth, and its provisions and 
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structure have influenced subsequent limitations.  Characteristics of Proposition 1 
common to similar ensuing legislation include: limits on the growth of local and state 
government, an emergency reserve fund, the mandatory refund of surplus revenue, and 
required voter consent for tax increases.    
Discontent over taxation persisted in California despite the failed passage of 
Proposition 1, and an assortment of citizen initiatives materialized, including Proposition 
13 and Proposition 4, known as the Gann Amendment.  Proposition 13, passed by 
California voters in 1978, sparked a national discussion that landed Howard Jarvis (the 
proposition’s champion) a Time magazine cover and presaged similar successive 
legislation in other states.  Within two years of the passage of Proposition 13, 43 states 
had implemented some kind of property tax limitation or relief, 15 lowered their income 
tax rates, and 10 indexed their income taxes for inflation (Mullins and Wallin 2-3).  The 
Gann Amendment, which passed in 1979, also distinctly curbed prospects for the 
California state government.  Since California’s enactment of restrictive taxation 
measures, twenty-eight other states, including Colorado, have enacted tax and 
expenditure limitations, the attributes and effects of which are varied. 
 
2.4 General Characteristics of Tax and Expenditure Limitations 
The various types of state limitations can be categorized into three broad groups: 
revenue limits, expenditure limits, and hybrids.  Revenue limits are those limits that link 
allowable state revenue retention to some measure, such as inflation or personal income.  
Expenditure limits link allowable annual state spending to growth indexes.  Hybrids 
blend characteristics of both expenditure and revenue limitations.   
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Overall, Colorado’s limitations are distinctive, as are those in each state.  For 
example, some state TELs have minimal or even no impact on state budgeting, while the 
effects of others are much more binding.  Limitations may differ based upon how they 
were enacted; whether they are statutory or constitutional; their degree of flexibility; how 
they handle the transfer of governmental programs; whether the TEL restricts spending or 
revenue; and how one TEL may interact with others enacted within the same state.  
Further, state TELs may also differ decidedly depending upon how the spending or 
revenue limit is calculated and the treatment of revenue collected in excess of the limit. 
Despite the many characteristic differences of tax and expenditure limitations 
among states, there are certain fundamental attributes common to most TELS.  It is 
largely diversity among these fundamental features common to most TELs that 
influences the specific nature of limitations in each state.  It is also generally a 
combination of the features of TELs that affects their level of restrictiveness, and since 
the combinations of features vary across states, the restrictiveness of TELs on 
governments is also assorted among states.   
Sources of Limits   
How a TEL comes about can often affect how restrictive it is.  TELs enacted by 
way of the citizen initiative process are usually more restrictive than those initiated by 
legislatures. Colorado’s TELs have been enacted through both legislative and citizen 
action. 
Revenue & Spending Limits   
Since state officials generally possess more control over spending than revenue, 
revenue limits are conventionally more restrictive than spending limits.  The state of 
  13
Colorado maintains both types of limits including TABOR, the Gallagher Amendment, 
Amendment 23, and the six percent limit.  
Flexibility 
The flexibility of TELs varies widely from state to state.  For example, some 
TELs exempt specific categories of spending or revenues from their limits.  Some 
common exemptions include Medicaid, debt service, federal mandates, and court orders.  
Also, some TELs allow for flexibility during economic recessions.  Colorado’s 
appropriations limit allows for greater flexibility than does its revenue limit.   
Statutory & Constitutional Limits 
Whether a limitation is constitutionally or statutorily enacted has significant 
implications since constitutional limitations are harder to change than statutory 
limitations.  Changes to constitutional limitations require a referred measure, which 
voters may adopt or reject.  Conversely, changes to statutory limitations, while politically 
risky, require a vote of the General Assembly and signature of the Governor, but not a 
popular electoral vote.  While Colorado’s revenue limit is constitutional, due to 
TABOR’s provisions, voter approval is compulsory in order to weaken the provisions of 
the statutory appropriations limit.  
Government Transfers & Limits 
If governmental programs are transferred between federal, state, or local 
governments, several states permit a concurrent change to the limit.  This is sometimes 
done to exempt certain programs from limits.  Eighteen TELs don’t have provisions 
addressing the transfer of responsibility of government programs (Legislative 22).  
Except for the area of K-12 education, Colorado’s TABOR amendment enables local 
governments to reduce or end subsidies to any state mandated program.   
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Limit Calculation   
There is also much variety among states regarding limit calculation 
methodologies.  The most popular method of TEL limit calculation indexes government 
spending increases to the growth rate of state personal income (Legislative 22).  Limits 
calculated this way are usually not as restrictive as those limits calculated by population 
growth or inflation since, over time, personal income generally grows more quickly than 
population growth and inflation.   
Another method of calculating limits uses a fixed percentage increase above the 
prior year’s appropriations.  Limits of this nature are typically more restrictive, though 
exactly how much more restrictive they are depends largely on the size of the percentage 
increase.  The revenue limit for the state of Colorado is computed using population 
growth and inflation, while the appropriations limit is computed simply by incorporating 
an annual, fixed percentage increase.  Some studies suggest that those TEL limits based 
on population growth and inflation, like Colorado’s TABOR limit, prevail as the most 
restrictive sort (Legislative 23). 
 
  
Figure 1:  Indicators Used to Calculate Tax and Expenditure Limits 
Source:  HJR 03-1033 Study: TABOR, Amendment 23, the Gallagher 
Amendment, and Other Fiscal Issues. Prepared by Colorado Legislative 
Council Staff, p. 23.  
 
Handling of Surpluses    
Surplus revenue is an amount collected in excess of a state’s permissible revenue 
limit.  States that mandate the refund of surplus revenue have more restrictive limitations 
than states that don’t.  Some states have limits so lofty that refunds are rarely made.  In 
anticipation of future economic downturns, and in order to cope with such downturns, a 
number of states divert a portion of surplus revenue to rainy day funds.  Colorado is one 
of ten states that require the immediate refund of surplus revenues to taxpayers. The 
requirement of an immediate refund is generally regarded as more restrictive because 
such a stipulation makes it difficult for states to retain any excess revenue for rainy day 
funds.  
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Ratchet-Down Effect 
The limit for some states is based upon the lesser of the appropriations of the 
previous year or actual spending or revenue in the previous year.  A state that uses this 
methodology will experience what is referred to as the ratchet-down effect, which occurs 
when revenue collected is below a state’s allowable limit.   When this occurs, the 
allowable limit for subsequent years is then reduced and it becomes quite difficult to 
increase that limit.  Conversely, states that base limits on just the allowable limit of the 
previous year (not whatever was actual revenue or spending) avoid the ratchet-down 
effect.  In Colorado, the ratchet-down effect was a problem during the recession, and 
voter approval of Referendum C eliminated the effect for future years.     
Enforcement 
Some state TELs specifically grant taxpayers the right to sue as recourse against 
the state should it fail to uphold the Amendment’s requirements.  Colorado’s TABOR 
Amendment allows for such action by taxpayers to ensure that TABOR’s provisions are 
adhered to.  If plaintiffs are successful in such a lawsuit, TABOR requires that any 
revenue collected, kept, or spent illegally for four fiscal years prior to the filing of a suit 
is to be refunded with 10 percent simple, annual interest. 
 
Summary 
Much controversy surrounds direct democracy and the use of citizen initiatives to 
enact laws such as tax and expenditure limitations.  Among the more prominent 
criticisms is the potential threat posed to minority interests when laws are made by 
sidestepping institutions and processes of the representative democracy system.  The 
initiative process effectively allows the will of the majority to be transformed into laws 
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that govern society as a whole, regardless of the impact of those laws on minority sub-
populations.  Colorado’s TABOR amendment came about through the citizen initiative 
process, which makes questions concerning TABOR’s impact on minority interests 
relevant.  Due to its structure, characteristics, and placement in the Colorado 
Constitution, which makes voter approval mandatory for changes to it, Colorado’s 
TABOR Amendment is widely deemed the most restrictive tax and expenditure 
limitation in the country. 
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3. Tax & Expenditure Limitations in Colorado 
3.1 Overview 
Written in 1876, the Colorado Constitution, which mandates a balanced budget 
and imposes restraints on practicable debt, is one of the longest and easiest to amend, a 
characteristic that explains the nearly 150 amendments to the constitution since its 
origination.  As afforded by the Colorado Constitution, in practically every biennial 
election items are placed on the ballot to amend statutory law or the state constitution.  
Such items make their way on the ballot through the citizen initiative process or are 
referred to voters by the General Assembly.  Regarding initiatives and referenda the 
Article V, section one of the Colorado Constitution specifies: 
The people reserve the right to themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to 
the Constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the General 
Assembly and also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any 
act or item, section, or part of any act of the General Assembly. 
 
In comparison to other states, the public sector in Colorado is quite limited at the 
state level, and much authority is delegated to local governments.  A 2004 report by 
Colorado Legislative Council Staff compared state and local government taxes in 
Colorado to those of other states.  The report indicates the limited scope of state 
government in Colorado relative to other states.  Sales and use taxes, individual income 
tax, and local property tax are the primary taxes paid by Colorado citizens.  In 2004, 
Colorado ranked 49th nationally in state tax collections, while local governments ranked 
7th nationally.  Local governments rely heavily upon sales taxes and sales and use taxes 
  19
for revenues, and most locally raised revenues for counties and school districts are 
derived from local property taxes. 
Colorado citizens are commonly mistrustful of government.  The Wells Fargo 
Public Opinion Research Program of the Graduate School of Public Affairs at the 
University of Colorado at Denver has surveyed registered voters in the state annually 
since 1994 and published the survey results in Mind of Colorado.  Voters have been 
consistently questioned on their level of confidence in numerous Colorado institutions 
each year.  Typically, the institutions in which most Coloradoans have the highest levels 
of confidence are the military, colleges and universities, charities and volunteer 
organizations, businesses, and local law enforcement.  In 2003, the lowest ranked 
institutions were political parties (12 percent), organized labor (19 percent), Colorado 
state agencies (21 percent), and the state legislature (26 percent) (James and Wallis 20). 
Colorado can be described as a leader nationally regarding the number of 
enterprises undertaken in an effort to restrain government spending and taxes.  In addition 
to the enactment of TELs, the initiative process in the state has been used for a variety of 
issues such as term limits for elected offices.  The mere threat of initiatives has frequently 
prompted legislators to act preemptively via statutes or by submitting a proposed 
amendment to voters—a response many other state legislatures have resorted to in the 
face of looming citizen initiatives (James and Wallis 21). 
The first citizen initiative concerning the addition of a tax and expenditure 
limitation to the state Constitution was proposed in 1966.  The 1966 initiative would have 
limited property taxes and made personal property taxes exempt from taxation.  The 1966 
initiative failed, as did others proposed in 1972, 1976, and 1978.  Constitutional tax and 
expenditure limits and legislation relevant to such limits have since passed, which include 
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the Gallagher Amendment, TABOR, Amendment 23, and Referendum C.  The 
Arveschoug-Bird limit, also a prominent TEL, is a statutory limit. 
 
3.2 The Arveschoug-Bird Limit 
Passed in 1977, the Kadlecek Amendment imposed a limit on General Fund 
spending.  The Amendment limited General Fund spending growth to seven percent 
above the prior year, mandated the preservation of a four percent reserve account, and 
provided that the excess revenues be used for property tax relief.  The current General 
Fund appropriations limit, the Arveschoug-Bird limit1 was enacted in 1991.  The 
Arveschoug-Bird limit, named after Representative Arveschoug and Senator Bird who 
sponsored the bill that contained the limit, is more commonly known as the six percent 
limit.   
The provisions of the six percent limit require that annual growth be limited to 
the lesser of five percent of Colorado personal income tax or six percent above total state 
General Fund appropriations in the prior fiscal year.2  Legislators have generally 
interpreted the six percent limit as a floor since is advantageous to appropriate up to the 
appropriations limit in order to raise the appropriations base for the next fiscal year.  
Appropriating below the six percent limit serves to ratchet down the base for subsequent 
years. 
The six percent limit does not apply to certain designated portions of the budget.  
Exceptions from the limit include: General Fund appropriations for property tax 
1 C.R.S. §24-75-201 (1). 
 
2 C.R.S. §24-75-201 (1) (a) (II). 
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reappraisals, revenues derived from a voter-approved increase in the rate or amount of 
any new tax or fee, new federally mandated programs, or supplemental appropriations for 
Medicaid.  Additional areas of the budget excluded from the 6 percent limit include 
General Fund transfers to the Capital Construction Fund3 and the Controlled 
Maintenance T
  
3.3 The Gallagher Amendment 
In 1982, national concern over property taxes was pronounced. The Colorado 
Legislature proposed the Gallagher Amendment to voters to prevent a tax revolt in 
Colorado similar to California’s, and the measure passed.  The Gallagher Amendment5 is 
a constitutional amendment with two functions.  First, the amendment reduced the 
percentage of local property taxes paid by owners of residential property, and second, it 
froze that percentage in place.  
Property taxes are determined by multiplying two variables: the taxable value of 
property (assessed value) by the local tax rate (mill levy).  Assessed value is determined 
by multiplying the property value by an assessment rate.  The amendment requires 
adjustments of the residential assessment rate yearly so that the percentage of assessed 
value attributable to residential property remains the same from year to year.  The overall 
effect of the Gallagher Amendment is to keep residential property taxes down, even as 
home values rise.  Colorado’s economic boom during the 1990s resulted in a sharp rise in 
3 C.R.S. §24-75-302 (2): Excludes General Fund transfers to the Capital Construction Fund from 
the six percent limit. 
 
4 C.R.S. §24-75-201.1 (1) (c.5) (II): Excludes transfers to the Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund 
from the six percent limit. 
 
5 Colorado Constitution, Article X, Section (3) (1) (b). 
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residential property values.  However, in accordance with the provisions of Gallagher, 
this growth was exempt from taxation. 
Seventeen other states use different assessment rates to reduce the residential 
property tax burden.  Some offer credits or exemptions, while others maintain limits on 
increases in property taxes for individual properties.  The Gallagher Amendment 
uniquely curtails the percentage of property taxes paid by all owners of residential 
property statewide, irrespective of individual properties.   
 
3.4 The Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR) 
 
3.4.1 National Context in Which TABOR Was Approved 
Tax and expenditure limitations were again popularized throughout the early 
1990s, and ten new TELs were enacted between 1990 and 2005.  The TELs enacted in 
the 1990s differed from those passed in the first wave in that the emphasis of the TELs 
passed in the second wave was limiting state spending and government growth rather 
than reducing the existing tax burden (Hill et al. 18).  To this end, those TELs passed in 
the second wave limited revenue collection or spending to indexes like population growth 
or personal income growth.  
There are assorted opinions concerning causes underlying the rise of TEL 
enactment in the 1990s.  Mullins and Poulson point to the recession of the early 1990s as 
a motivator for renewed interest in TELs.  Poulson attributes the rise to differences in the 
long-term growth rates in state revenues and the growth rates of state spending, and to the 
varying government responses to recessionary revenue shortfalls among states in the 
1990s (Poulson, “The Next”).  Mullins asserts that voters in states without TELs became 
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increasingly frustrated with the proportion of government spending relative to the overall 
economy (Mullins and Wallin 113). 
New, Stansel, Johnson and McKacken emphasize voter participation in the 
1990s, and indicate that direct democracy and voter dissatisfaction were heightened 
during this period.  New asserts that direct democracy was gaining popularity during the 
1990s, evidenced by the 1996 election in which American voters encountered over 90 
statewide initiatives and nearly 200 local initiatives or referenda (4).  Stansel refers to the 
increased enactment of TELs in the 1990s as a broad-based political movement, and 
points out that between 1992 and 1994, five states passed TELs (Stansel 91).  Johnson 
and McKacken concur, and suggest that the American electorate in 1992 and 1994 was 
swelling with anti-tax, anti-government sentiments. 
 
3.4.2 History of TABOR’s Enactment 
Colorado was no exception to widespread anti-tax sentiments, and after three 
prior failed attempts, in 1992 Colorado voters endorsed the Taxpayer Bill of Rights.  Like 
California’s Proposition 13, TABOR’s passage was also the result of citizen initiative.  In 
1986, Douglas Bruce, a Colorado Springs resident, began his crusade for TABOR and it 
was ultimately placed on the ballot for voter consideration.  The intent of the proposed 
amendment was to require voter consent for new taxes or tax increases, which would 
invariably reduce the scope of influence of Colorado state and local government officials.  
Despite incipient, broad support among voters, the amendment failed.  This was to be the 
Bruce’s first of four initiatives proposed to markedly curtail the adequacy of the Colorado 
government.   
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In 1988, Douglas Bruce insistently advocated for a second, more demanding 
initiative that would have required voter approval for new state or local tax increases; 
reduced state income taxes by ten percent; limited local residential property taxes to one 
percent; and, unless approved by voters, would have overturned state and local tax 
increases passed between 1986 and 1988 (James and Wallis 22).  As in 1986, support for 
the amendment was high at the outset, but then diminished subsequently in the face of a 
well-funded, well-organized opposition campaign.  According to Denver Post/ News 4 
polls, support for the amendment on October 5, 1988 was 60 percent, but dropped to 45 
percent on October 27, just twenty-two days later (James and Wallis 22).  Constituents 
of the opposition to Bruce’s amendment included: U.S. West (which has since become 
Qwest), Adolph Coors Co., the Colorado Cattleman’s Association, then Colorado’s 
Governor Roy Romer, various education groups, and numerous prominent executives and 
political leaders.  Ultimately, Bruce’s second attempt also fell short.  
Bruce was not dissuaded by the second defeat, and in 1990 mounted an attempt 
in advocacy of a third initiative.  This initiative offered a limit on the growth of state 
spending, required voter approval for tax increases, and a limit on local property taxes.  
Support for this initiative surpassed that of the previous two, and prominent state leaders 
stood by it as well.  Moreover, the campaign for the third initiative raised more capital, 
which was particularly advantageous as it allowed Bruce to buy television time.  Despite 
heightened support, the third initiative received only 48.9 percent of votes and thus failed 
by 21,600 votes (James and Wallis 23). 
In 1992, Douglas Bruce finally triumphed with his fourth and final initiative, now 
known as the TABOR Amendment, which passed with 53.7 percent of votes in favor, 
46.3 percent of votes against (James and Wallis 23).  When TABOR passed in 1992, 
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Colorado was already one of the most fiscally conservative states.  According to a 
statewide Colorado Citizens Poll conducted in 1992, 63 percent of participants 
proclaimed that state and local taxes were too high and that government should address 
the issue (James and Wallis 23).  Well-organized backing from Conservatives and 
business groups decidedly promoted Bruce’s fourth attempt.  Concisely, the message 
conveyed to voters was that lower taxes would improve the economy—a message similar 
to that used to promote California’s Gann Amendment—and polling data suggests that 
this message was aligned with the majority of voter sentiments.   
Another factor contributing to TABOR’s passage was decreased opposition to the 
Amendment.  Instead of TABOR, an amendment aimed at K-12 education was Governor 
Romer’s central focus during the 1992 election.  Also, apart from the outright rejection of 
TABOR, the Colorado legislature failed to provide voters with an option other than 
Douglas Bruce’s proposed TEL. 
 
3.4.3 Main Provisions of TABOR 
TABOR is the state’s most confining limit and, from special library districts to 
the state level, it applies to every level of the Colorado government.  Over 1900 words 
long, the TABOR amendment governs practically every state revenue and expenditure 
decision made in the state of Colorado (“The Colorado Budget”).  The general provision 
of TABOR states, “It’s preferred interpretation shall reasonably restrain most of the 
growth of government.”6 TABOR was proposed as a measure to: slow taxes and 
spending growth at the state and local government levels; control and provide 
information about local debt; put the people more in control of their taxes; encourage 
6 Colorado Constitution, Article X, Section (20). 
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t 
rowth (Holden). 
better utilization of public monies; create incentives for fiscal prudence and governmen
productivity; and ultimately stimulate business and job g
The TABOR amendment has four central provisions that function to: require 
voter approval for government revenue increases, limit revenue growth, freeze existing 
spending limits, and limit taxation options. 
(1) Voter Approval for Revenue Increases  
TABOR requires that voters agree to any new tax, increase of tax rates, mill levy 
increases, or the extension of an expiring tax or a tax policy change directly causing a net 
tax revenue gain for the government.  TABOR does allow for decreases of tax rates, mill 
levies, and debt limits without the requirement of voter consent.     
(2) Revenue Growth Limit  
Principally, the purpose of TABOR revenue limits is to prevent annual allowable 
state revenue collections from exceeding inflation plus population growth.  If collected 
revenue does exceed TABOR’s limits, then that quantity collected above the limits must 
be refunded to taxpayers.  The first two refunds made to Colorado taxpayers took the 
form of a sales tax refund.  There are now a total of 19 separate refund mechanisms.  
Voters may also choose to forgo refunds or tax cuts, and approve measures that allow the 
government to maintain possession of the excess collected revenue.   
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Formula for Calculating the TABOR Limit Imposed on the Colorado 
State Budget, Article X, Section 20 (7) (a) of the Colorado Constitution. 
 
Source:  Colorado Legislative Council, “State Limits on Appropriations and 
Spending,” December 2004. 
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Figure 2 shows the formula used to calculate all allowable state fiscal year 
spending. At the state level, population change and inflation are integral fragments of 
limit calculation.  Growth for most state revenue is limited to the Denver-Boulder-
Greeley inflation rate, which takes into account the change in various prices of products 
bought by consumers in the three cities, plus the annual percentage change in the state’s 
population.7 Throughout the 1990s, the population of Colorado grew at an average of 
2.3% annually—the third highest growth rate in the nation—and between 1992 and 2002, 
Colorado’s population exceeded 4.4 million (Hedges et al.).  TABOR proponents suggest 
that the combination of population growth and the CPI provides a measure of the growth 
of the state economy, and, as such, provides the measure of comparison for which the 
appropriate level of retained government revenue should be based.   
For TABOR limit calculation at the local level, the inflation rate remains, but 
other criteria are incorporated in the allowable revenue growth formulas.  Figure 3 
indicates the various TABOR formulas.  While the Denver-Boulder-Greeley CPI figure is 
the same in calculating TABOR formulas for allowable growth in government spending, 
the growth factor for local governments is net new construction, and the growth factor for 
school districts is change in enrollment.  
 
7 C.R.S. §24-77-103 (2): Specifies the procedures for calculating state population growth for the 
TABOR revenue formula. 
 
  
Figure 3: TABOR Formulas for Calculating Allowable Growth in Government 
Spending. 
 
Source: The Bell Policy Center, Ten Years of TABOR: A Study of Colorado’s 
Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (Denver: The Bell Policy Center, February 
2003). 
 
 
(3) Voter Approval and Existing Limits  
TABOR’s “weakening provision” ensures that existing revenue limits, spending, 
and debt can only be weakened by voter approval, which means that when TABOR 
passed, the weakening provision fixed into place all other limitations.  Officials may 
lower those limitations at any time, but raising the limitations requires voter approval.  
While the government may spend less than the statutory limits allow, revenue that is not 
spent in one year can’t be used during the next year.  
(4) Restrictions of Taxation Options 
TABOR also encumbers taxation options for state and local governments.  Tax 
districts must receive voter permission for new taxes, a local mill levy increase extending 
a tax set to expire, or tax policy that leads to a net tax revenue gain.  A state income tax 
change must have a single rate, and income tax increases must take effect a year after 
they are approved.  TABOR disallows altogether the imposition of certain types of taxes 
including: new or increased real estate transfer taxes, state real property tax or local 
district income tax, or new surcharges on state income taxes. 
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3.4.4 TABOR Surplus Refund Mechanisms 
 When revenues collected exceed the allowance afforded by the TABOR formula, 
excess collected revenues, per TABOR, are to be refunded to taxpayers.  However, the 
exact processes by which refunds are to be made is not clearly specified within the 
TABOR law.  The absence of clarity in this matter has led some to question how refunds 
in Colorado have been allocated.  More specifically, some critics (e.g. Poulson) argue 
that vagueness regarding the distribution of surplus expenditures has allowed legislators 
to pursue a political agenda benefiting interest groups—without voter approval.   
 Although TABOR passed in 1992, revenues were below the TABOR revenue 
limit until 1997.  When legislators realized that funds would have to be refunded, their 
response was to seek voter approval to forgo the refund.  But voters declined.  
Regardless, legislators have persistently increased spending growth over the amount 
allowed by TABOR because of the past accumulation of reserve funds (Surplus 12).  
According to Poulson, in recent years the Legislature has chosen to offset surplus 
revenues with tax refunds and tax cuts that have very little to do with the generation of 
the surplus revenues.  This has permitted legislators to pursue a political agenda 
benefiting a variety of different interest groups (Surplus 12).   
 Poulson also notes, “The TABOR Amendment has had a perverse outcome for 
budgetary decision making…The TABOR Amendment has resulted in budgetary 
decisions that are less efficient and less equitable than those that would have been made 
in the absence of the surplus revenue” (Surplus 12).  TABOR was not passed to provide 
legislators with the ability to provide tax refunds and tax relief to specific interest groups, 
and this aspect of TABOR represents an unintended consequence.   
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3.5 Amendment 23 
In FY 1999-00, the state of Colorado ranked 46th in the percent of expenditure on 
schooling (James and Wallis 16).  The TABOR formula was in effect, but school 
expenses surpassed inflation and spending per pupil decreased consequently.  To address 
disparities between Colorado and other states in the area of public school funding, teacher 
unions proposed Amendment 23, a November 2000 ballot initiative.  At the polls, fifty-
four percent of voters approved the amendment (James and Wallis 24). 
Like TABOR, Amendment 23 is a highly controversial constitutional measure 
that has considerably impacted state revenue allocation since its enactment.  The 
amendment passed in 2000 at the end of an economic boom that had resulted in 
significant surplus revenues.  In promoting Amendment 23 to voters, some advocates 
even indicated that surpluses would persist and that those revenues would be available to 
fund the requirements of the amendment, which was not the case in 2001.  
Amendment 23 made four significant changes to state funding for K-12 public 
education. Overall, the four main provisions of Amendment 23 ensure funding increases 
for K-12 public education funding.  
(1) Statewide Base Increases in the School Finance Act 
The Amendment requires that the statewide base in the school finance act 
increase by a minimum of inflation plus one percent through FY 2010-11, and by the rate 
of inflation thereafter.  The statewide base is the per-pupil funding amount for districts, 
which varies among districts due to such factors as a school district’s size and living 
costs. 
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(2) Categorical Program Funding Increases 
Amendment 23 requires that total funding for all categorical programs be 
increased by at least inflation plus one percent for ten years.  Funding for all categorical 
programs is to increase by the inflation rate after that.  Categorical programs are intended 
to serve specific groups of students or student needs, such as English language 
proficiency programs, special education programs, and expelled and at-risk student 
programs.  The General Assembly allocates the total funding increase among categorical 
programs as it sees fit. 
 
(3) State Education Fund  
Amendment 23 establishes the State Education Fund (SEF) and transfers one-
third of one percent of federal taxable income to the Fund.  Revenues transferred to the 
Fund are exempted from both the TABOR limit and spending of Fund revenues 
exempted from the six percent appropriations limit.  SEF revenue can be used for a 
variety of uses such as class size reduction, public school building capital construction, 
improving student safety, and compliance with the requirement to increase categorical 
program funding annually. 
(4) Maintenance of Effort 
The maintenance of effort provision is an especially significant component of 
Amendment 23 that functions to guarantee funding increases to K-12 public education.  
The provision requires General Fund contribution increases to the school finance act by a 
minimum of five percent every year through FY 2010-11 if personal income grows by at 
least four and one-half percent. 
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Summary 
Colorado has historically maintained stronger local governments relative to the 
state government, and Coloradoans have traditionally preferred that government maintain 
a smaller role.  Colorado can be described as a leader nationally regarding its limitations 
enacted to restrain government growth.  Colorado maintains the six percent limit, the 
Gallagher Amendment, TABOR, and Amendment 23, and each limitation affects specific 
areas of the budget.   
 In short, the six percent limit applies to the state’s General Fund, and limits 
appropriations to six percent above the prior year’s total state General Fund 
appropriations.  The Gallagher Amendment limits the amount of revenue that can be 
collected from residential property owners.  Voters approved TABOR as a means to limit 
the growth of government. TABOR limits total state revenue collection to inflation plus 
population growth, requires voter approval for certain state actions, and limits taxation 
options.  Amendment 23 requires annual increases for K-12 education funding. 
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4. The Colorado Economy & Government Revenues 
4.1 The State Budget Process 
Colorado’s TELs serve to guide the budgeting process in that they collectively 
influence options for state revenue retention, spending, and allocation.  The process of 
establishing the state budget in a given year is a lengthy process, lasting around a year 
from beginning to end, and is one in which the influence of TELs is especially well 
known to budget officials.  
The Joint Budget Committee (JBC), the six member committee that dominates 
the Colorado state budget, is comprised of the Chairman of the House Appropriations 
Committee, one House majority party member, one House minority party member, the 
Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, one Senate majority party member, 
and one Senate minority party member.8  The JBC and its staff of sixteen prepare the 
state budget throughout the year, and then submit the “Long Bill” to the legislature for its 
approval and ultimately the Governor’s signature. 
 While it is within the scope of the legislature’s duties to write and pass the 
budget, the Governor’s office is significant to the process.  The fiscal year begins July 1, 
and ends June 30, but the legislative and executive branches coordinate throughout the 
entire year as the state’s budget needs fluctuate.  The governor’s office oversees the 
operation of state government departments, and each year is responsible for creating an 
8 C.R.S. §2-3-201 (1).  
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executive budget that outlines funding priorities, revenues, and expenditures.  The 
executive budget is then submitted to the JBC.  
 Once the JBC receives the executive budget, the JBC holds hearings with the 
various departments.  Each of the sixteen members of the JBC staff is assigned to a 
specific department.  The staff members carefully review the executive budget request, 
meet with representatives from departments, and then present relevant information to the 
JBC in November.  Following JBC staff briefings, the JBC begins hearings with the 
departments.  JBC hearings allow JBC members to further assess departmental budget 
requests by asking departmental staff about new funding needs and general issues 
concerning the department’s fiscal status in the next fiscal year. 
 Actual preparation of the Long Bill begins at the end of January.  The General 
Assembly is responsible for specifying how much revenue will be available for 
appropriation in the next fiscal year, which is asserted in a joint resolution.  In order to 
establish the revenue figure, the General Assembly can review revenue projections 
prepared by the Governor’s Office of State Planning and Budgeting and those forecasts 
made by the General Assembly’s economic office.  The amount of revenue available for 
appropriation is highly important since the Colorado constitution mandates a balanced 
budget each year, and the dollar amount specified by the General Assembly is basis for 
determining whether the budget is balanced.  Appropriated funds cannot exceed the total 
available funds for appropriation. 
 Throughout February and March the JBC and staff comb through department 
budget requests, compare requests with funds available for appropriation, and the JBC 
votes on each line item.  JBC staff prepares and balances the Long Bill, and it is sent to 
both houses of the General Assembly where it is routed through the same legislative 
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process that every other bills is.  Each party holds a caucus to discuss the Long Bill, 
question JBC staff, and formulate amendments to be offered to the bill during second 
reading.  The Long Bill passes to the floor where its merits are debated by the House and 
Senate.  Once it passes both houses, it is sent to the JBC, which serves as the conference 
committee that reconciles any differences between the chambers.  The JBC conference 
committee report is sent to both houses for adoption.   
The Governor receives the Long Bill after it has passed both houses, and is 
authorized only to veto particular line items in the bill.  The Long Bill finally becomes 
law once the Governor signs it, and responsibility for administering the budget 
throughout the year is within the scope of the duties of the Governor’s Office.9 
The structure of the state budget can change throughout the year as economic 
conditions and the budget needs of departments fluctuate over the course of a fiscal year.  
Departments are able to make supplemental funding requests, which are supposed to be 
submitted by the Office of State Planning and Budgeting to the JBC by January 1, but 
later requests can be submitted to address unusual or unforeseen circumstances.10 The 
JBC reviews supplemental requests and determines whether the request should be met 
with additional funds and the source of those funds.  The balanced budget mandate 
outlined in the constitution implies that for supplemental requests to be granted to a 
particular department, budget cuts must be made somewhere.  The General Assembly 
ultimately votes on supplemental appropriations bills. 
  
9 C.R.S. §24-37-301 (1). 
 
10 C.R.S. §24-37-304 (1) (b.5). 
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4.2 Categories of State Funds 
The state receives revenues from a number of sources including federal grants, 
taxes, fees and fines.  Once collected, revenue is allocated among various state funds for 
the payment of state government operations.  A host of restrictions affect how much 
revenue can even be in each type of fund and how legislators may spend the money in 
each fund.  State revenues are divided into four categories: (1) General Funds, (2) Cash 
Funds, (3) Cash Funds Exempt, and (4) Federal Funds.    
Of the primary categories of state funds, the uses of three are fairly rigidly 
defined, which makes General Funds especially significant to the state budgeting process.  
Reliance upon the General Fund varies among agencies.  Some agencies, like the 
Department of Corrections, depend on the General Fund almost absolutely.  Numerous 
agencies receive revenues from a combination of fund types.  For example, the 
Department of Higher Education receives General Funds and raises revenue through 
tuition and student fees.  Other programs and departments, like the Department of 
Regulatory Agencies, receive revenues nearly entirely from Cash Funds.   
(1) General Funds  
Of the state funds, the General Fund is the largest and most flexible, and is used 
predominately to facilitate the main functions of state government.  General Funds are the 
least restrictive and most competitive funds, and legislative debate on the budget is most 
often debate over the use of General Funds.  The General Fund is also the fund from 
which TABOR refunds are made.  The source of General Funds is state tax revenues, 
such as sales and income taxes. 
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(2) Cash Funds   
Cash Funds come from taxes, fines, and fees and are designated for the specific 
programs or purposes for which they are collected.  Examples include transportation fees 
and tuition for higher education. 
(3) Cash Funds Exempt 
Cash Funds Exempt are cash funds exempted from TABOR restrictions. 
Examples of Cash Funds Exempt are funds transferred between government agencies and 
donations to the state.  Revenues raised from enterprises such as the State Fair also 
qualify as Cash Funds Exempt.  The remainder of Amendment 35 taxes (cigarette taxes) 
is counted as Cash Funds Exempt too. 
(4) Federal Funds 
Federal Funds are those received from the federal government.  These funds may 
be designated for short-term use or long-term, joint federal-state programs such as 
Medicaid.  Matching state funds may also be a requisite for receipt of Federal Funds. 
 
4.3 The Spending of State Revenues 
In addition to Colorado’s TELs, state budget decisions are influenced by an 
assortment of other limitations that affect how state revenues are spent.  Federal Funds 
are usually accompanied by spending requirements, and the executive branch has 
discretion over spending for most Federal Funds.  Cash Funds and Cash Funds Exempt 
are designated for specific programs and uses.   In short, the uses of three of the state’s 
four categories of funds are fairly rigidly defined.  Since the General Fund is the least 
restricted fund, it is central to the budgeting process.  But there are limitations on General 
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Fund use too.  Over 90 cents of every General Fund dollar is spent on six categories of 
essential services, which leaves very little available for other programs and services.  
Underlying cost drivers and laws that require minimum funding levels influence 
the funding structures for the six main programs.  For example, state and federal laws 
require the provision of at least a basic education system for every child, minimum 
benefits through the Medicaid program, and mandatory sentencing laws that correspond 
with prison population growth and higher corrections spending.   
The budget needs of programs also expand with rising operational costs, such as 
medical services and training for personnel (“The Colorado Budget”).  The overall 
influence of state and federal laws and underlying cost drivers on legislators is significant 
because they limit the ability of legislators to set and fund other priorities.  Legislators in 
all states face somewhat similar encumbrances with respect to federal and state law 
compliance and cost drivers.  However, the situation in Colorado is made considerably 
more complicated because of Colorado’s tax and expenditure limitations and their varied 
requirements. 
 
Summary 
The implications of the budget’s composition in each fiscal year are vast. Around 
the state, the budget affects local economies, living conditions, and various sectors such 
as public health, education, and corrections.  Forming the state budget is a complicated 
process that is made more complex by Colorado’s tax and expenditure limitations.  
TABOR limits total revenues legislators have to work with, and the six percent limit caps 
General Fund spending. Amendment 23 mandates K-12 education funding increases, and 
Gallagher holds down property tax revenues.  Further, underlying cost drivers also 
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influence the state’s budget needs and can affect the allocation of funds across 
departments. 
Legislators have limited options and maneuverability when it comes to budget 
decisions.  The General Fund is key to most state operations and programs since the uses 
of General Funds are the least restricted.  But General Funds are also burdened by 
restrictions since over 90 cents of every dollar is spent on the provision of essential 
services.  Cash funds are for designated uses, typically for the programs or purposes for 
which they are collected.  Cash Funds Exempt are exempt from TABOR restrictions and 
represent a very small portion of the budget.  Federal Funds often involve specific 
requirements for their use, such as the provision of certain programs or services to certain 
populations. 
  40
 
 
 
 
5. The 2001-04 Recession 
5.1 Colorado Economy During the Recession 
The Colorado economy prospered throughout the 1990s, and by many standards 
Colorado’s economy even outdistanced that of the nation.  From 1991 to 2000, Colorado 
employment increased yearly at a rate of 4.1 percent and over 670,000 jobs were created; 
national employment increased annually by 2.2 percent during the same years 
(Legislative 3).  The Colorado population increased at the third fastest rate nationally 
between 1990 and 2000 as it rose by over one million, and personal income increased 
annually at a rate of 8.2 percent throughout the decade, the second fastest rate nationally 
(Legislative 3). 
Three sectors of the Colorado economy drove the upswing: advanced technology, 
construction, and tourism.  Within the advanced technology sector it was the 
telecommunications industry that grew especially.  Employment and the average wage in 
the Colorado telecommunications industry doubled during the 1990s, and the industry 
invested considerably in fiber-optic cable networks.  Further notable growth in the 
advanced technology sector included the software and advanced technology manufacture 
industries as national investment in these products surged.  To meet the demands of 
Colorado’s expanding population, the advanced technology and telecommunications 
firms invested in commercial real estate, and residential construction swelled to meet 
rising demands of the expanding upwardly mobile population.  Finally, the strength of the 
national economy promoted the tourism industry as households prospered. 
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As the national economy slid into recession in 2001 so did Colorado’s.  It was the 
sectors that drove the boom during the 1990s that suffered the most during the recession.  
The advanced technology boom ended in March 2000. The telecommunications industry 
suffered from a mismatch of supply and demand (cable was in oversupply while demand 
worldwide diminished).  Residential and commercial construction declined.  And the 
events of September 11 adversely impacted the tourism and airline industries.  Also 
compounding the recession in Colorado were wildfires that further damaged the tourism 
industry and an acute drought in the summer of 2002 that reduced crop harvests. 
Colorado lost over 81,000 jobs between December 2000 and July 2003.  Personal 
income growth fell from 11.4 percent in 2000 to 3.6 percent in 2001, and then to 0.8 
percent in 2002.  Nonresidential construction fell 14.2 percent in 2000, 0.6 percent in 
2001, and 20.9 percent in 2002 (Legislative 4).  Colorado’s recession was worse relative 
to that of the nation since Colorado’s economy had been bolstered by the three sectors 
hardest hit nationally—advanced technology, telecommunications, and tourism. 
 
Total Personal Income Employment Population  
Year Growth Rank Growth Rank Growth Rank 
1995 8.3% 3 4.5% 4 2.8% 4 
1996 7.6% 9 3.6% 6 2.4% 4 
1997 8.8% 3 4.2% 4 2.5% 3 
1998 8.9% 5 3.9% 3 2.4% 3 
1999 8.4% 1 3.6% 3 2.7% 3 
2000 11.4% 2 3.8% 3 2.4% 3 
2001 3.6% 26 0.6% 17 2.4% 3 
2002 0.8% 49 -1.9% 49 1.7% 6 
 
Figure 4: Colorado Economic Indicators 1995-2001 and National Rankings. 
 
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
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Figure four indicates Colorado’s ranking nationally in the areas of total personal 
income growth, employment growth, and population growth from 1995-2002.  Colorado 
lost more income and jobs than most states, and the state ranked 49th in both categories in 
2002.  The economic downturn and significant job losses placed a heavy burden on 
Colorado’s state government, and the compelling restrictiveness of Colorado’s TELs 
became widely known. 
Throughout the expansion of the 1990s, General Fund expenditures were limited 
by Colorado’s constitutional and statutory limits.  Surpluses were refunded to taxpayers, 
the six percent limit constrained General Fund appropriations, and, due to Colorado’s 
prosperity, a fairly significant volume of highway and capital construction could be 
funded.  The recession changed Colorado’s budget situation drastically since the status of 
the economy corresponds with revenues collected by the state.   
The recession reduced revenue collections to such a degree that falling revenues 
became the new constraint for legislators.  Both income and excise taxes contributed to 
over 90 percent of General Fund revenue from FY 1990-91 through FY 2002-03, which 
is significant because the collection of these taxes is highly sensitive to economic 
conditions.  Between FY 2000-01 and FY 2002-03, revenues from income taxes 
decreased by $1 billion, and revenues from excise taxes decreased by $89.1 million.  In 
order to supplement General Fund revenues during this period, the General Assembly 
transferred cash funds to the General Fund, a course of action not taken since FY 1991-
92, also a time of financial difficulty for the state when $11.6 million in transfers from 
the Capital Construction Fund had been transferred to the General Fund. 
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 Individual income tax revenue is highly correlated with salaries and wages.  In 
FY 2001-02, personal income growth was stagnant in Colorado, and employment 
declined.  Capital gains are also relevant to individual income tax revenue and can be 
unpredictable.  Throughout the 1990s, capital gains contributed to double-digit income 
tax growth.  Conversely, capital gains contributed to significant declines from 2001 
through 2003.  Capital gains contracted 44.5 percent nationally in 2001. 
Corporate profits fluctuate in an unpredictable fashion, as do corporate income 
taxes.  Between FY 1990-01 and FY 2000-01, corporate income taxes increased annually 
by 11.1 percent, but declined 46 percent in FY 2001-02.  The decline was largely due to 
the national recession and its repercussions for corporate earnings, especially for the 
telecommunications and advanced technology sectors, and the events of September 11 
2001.  Corporate income taxes did increase 26.4 percent in FY 2002-03, but were still 
$104.6 million less in FY 2002-03 than they had been in FY 2000-01. 
From FY 1990-91 through FY 2000-01, sales and use tax increased annually by 
8.5 percent, and during this same period, personal income increased yearly at 8.2 percent.  
In FY 2001-02, personal income growth was 0.3 percent, but sales and use taxes 
decreased 2.2 percent.  Sales and use taxes decreased 3 percent further in the next fiscal 
year. 
 
5.2 Legislative Responses to the Recession 
Throughout the 1990s, the economic upswing positively affected General Fund 
revenues, which were constrained by Colorado’s limits on revenue collections and 
spending.  Total General Fund expenditures increased yearly by 7.8 percent between FY 
1989-90 and FY 2000-01 from $2.6 billion to $5.94 billion.  The situation changed 
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dramatically in 2001 when declined collected revenues forced General Fund spending 
reductions.  In FY 2001-02 General Fund spending decreased by $221 million and by $96 
million in FY 2002-03 (Legislative 7).   General Fund spending finally increased by $82 
million in FY 2003-04. 
In response to declined General Fund revenues, legislators employed three 
strategies.  First, constitutionally protected programs and those relevant to public health 
and safety were made a priority.  Once prioritized, those programs low on the list and 
unable to be funded easily via other means were either scaled back or terminated 
altogether.  Second, legislators scoured for programs for which funding could be reduced 
or supplemented with revenues from sources other than the General Fund, and raised fees 
and fines for such programs.  Third, General Fund revenues were supplemented with 
revenue from Cash Funds in order to at least preserve the state’s core services.  
 
5.2.1 Prioritization of Government Programs 
During the recession, not only did the level of General Fund expenditures fall 
during the recession, but also the distribution of General Fund spending changed 
(Legislative 7).  Programs categorized as necessary for public health and safety and 
constitutionally mandated programs were made a priority. The Departments of Education, 
Health Care Policy and Financing, and Corrections all received greater funding from the 
General Fund.  General Fund spending for the six largest departments increased from $5 
billion to $5.3 billion between FY 2000-01 and FY 2003-04. General Fund spending for 
education increased by 12.8 percent between FY 2001-02 and FY 2003-04, much of 
which was due to mandated funding increases in accordance with Amendment 23.  
 During this period, total General Fund spending for education increased overall from 37.3 
percent to 42.4 percent of the General Fund. 
State budgeting in Colorado is a zero sum endeavor, so increased support for the 
major departments invariably corresponded with decreased funding elsewhere.  The 
percentage of General Funds allocated to the six major departments was 93 percent in FY 
2003-04, which constituted the highest percentage in the preceding fifteen years.  
Spending on other departments was cut by $82.3 million between FY 2000-01 and FY 
2003-04, and capital construction spending was reduced by $276 million (97 percent).  
General Fund spending for the Department of Higher Education decreased by $156 
million and funding for the Department of Human Services decreased by $30 million.  
Figure five indicates how General Fund spending was allocated among departments from 
FY 2000-01 to FY 2003-04.  
 
 
Figure 5:  Change in General Fund Spending (in millions of dollars) between FY  
2000-01 and FY 2003-04. 
 
Source:  Colorado Legislative Council Staff, p. 12. 
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5.2.2 Changes to State Program Funding Mechanisms  
Despite decreased General Fund allocations to many programs, several of those 
programs still experienced overall funding gains during the recession because of their 
funding structures.  Due to the shortage of General Funds, officials identified programs 
for which revenue sources other than the General Fund were available to fund the 
operations of departments.  While those programs received fewer General Fund dollars, 
numerous existing fees and fines were increased and others were instituted.  An example 
of this scenario is Senate Bill 03-261.  In order to address the absence of General Funds, 
Senate Bill 03-261 both raised existing fees and imposed new fees to fund the Division of 
Property Taxation, a division in the Department of Local Affairs.  
 Officials also instituted fees that would enable the state to receive matching 
federal funds.  For example, Senate Bill 03-266 created a new daily per patient fee 
imposed on selected nursing homes.  The fee imposition allowed for reduced General 
Fund allocations to the nursing facilities, matching federal Medicaid funds, and 
reimbursement for Medicaid services. 
 
5.2.3 Use of Cash Funds and Other Revenues to Supplement the General 
Fund 
Finally, revenues from Cash Funds were transferred to the General Fund in order 
to facilitate increased spending for The Departments of Education, Health Care Policy 
and Financing, and Corrections.  Transfers to the General Fund were substantial.  In FY 
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2001-02, net transfers from Cash Funds totaled $1 billion.  In FY 2002-03, net transfers 
totaled $206.2 million (Legislative 13). 
 
5.3 Legislative Council’s Assessment of Colorado’s TELs and the Recession  
In September 2003, Legislative Council Staff, the General Assembly’s own 
research department, assessed the interaction of TABOR, Amendment 23, and the 
Gallagher Amendment to provide the General Assembly with an understanding of how 
the TELs impacted the state’s ability to cope with the recession.  The report provided 
several options for addressing the difficulties imposed by Colorado’s TELs and making 
the state TABOR limits more responsive to the economy. 
 
5.3.1 Revenue and Spending Limits 
Actual revenues in FY 2001-02 became the TABOR base for calculating the next 
year’s limit and were $356.7 million below the TABOR limit for FY 2001-02.  Revenue 
in FY 2002-03 was $703.6 million below the TABOR limit for that year.  TABOR’s 
ratchet-down effect made the declined revenue bases permanent, and thus lowered the 
quantity of revenues the state could keep.  Figure six outlines the differences between the 
TABOR limit without the ratchet effect, which began in FY 2001-02, and the actual 
TABOR limit based on declined revenues.  As a consequence, state legislators had even 
fewer dollars to allocate during the recession. 
 
  
Figure 6: The Ratchet-down Effect and Colorado Government Revenues. 
 
Source:  Colorado Legislative Council Staff, p. 12. 
 
The ratchet-down effect, probably the most glaring unintended consequence of 
TABOR, permanently reduced Colorado’s allowable revenues for future years.  This 
effect was expected to be especially burdensome because as the state experienced 
population and inflation growth, a growing number of people would need state services at 
a higher cost.  To address this difficulty, Legislative Council suggested a constitutional 
amendment to the voters to eliminate the ratchet-down effect of TABOR.   
At the time, fourteen states used personal income in determining allowable 
revenue or spending limits.  Legislative Council offered, “Should the General Assembly 
decide that the current TABOR limit factors are not the most appropriate indicators for 
limiting government revenues, it could consider a constitutional amendment to use the 
annual percentage change in personal income as the growth limit on state revenue” 
(Legislative ix). 
Continuing to increase General Fund appropriations by six percent consumed an 
increasing amount of total revenues allowable under TABOR.  To address this, 
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Legislative Council suggested that the General Assembly could make the appropriations 
limit the same as the TABOR limit so that the two limits would move simultaneously.   
 
5.3.2 Fiscal Emergencies 
Forty-five states have reserve funds available for use during fiscal emergencies, 
known as rainy day funds, while Colorado does not.  Colorado does have two small 
reserve funds.  The first is required by statute and contains four percent of the state’s 
General Fund appropriations.  The second is constitutionally required and contains three 
percent of total TABOR revenue.  Legislative Council provided two specific options 
should the General Assembly wish to create a rainy day fund.  First, the General 
Assembly could have sought voter approval to change the constitutional reserve into a 
rainy day fund, and asked voters for permission to retain surplus revenue for such a fund.  
Use of the fund could have required a supermajority vote, and limits could have been 
placed on the percentage of the fund to be used at one time.  Second, the General 
Assembly could have sought voter approval to allow savings to be exempt from TABOR 
spending limits up to some specified amount and to require that the money count under 
TABOR limits when spent.  Colorado is still without a substantial rainy day fund. 
 
5.3.3 Property Taxes 
School funding is affected by property taxes and state funds.  State funds are 
used to supplement local funding sources, which is made up mostly of property taxes, and 
the amount provided under the school finance act.  Legislative Council reached three 
conclusions about Colorado’s property tax system.  The first conclusion was that 
constitutional limits held down property taxes in Colorado.  Second, the requirement to 
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revalue property every two years created a volatile pattern of growth in taxable property, 
and property taxes did not generate enough revenues to reach the limits allowed by law.  
Third, low property taxes burdened the state and forced increase funding in the school 
finance act over time, which put increasing pressure on the state budget.  
 Legislative Council offered the General Assembly diverse options for 
modification of the property tax system to make it more flexible during downturns.  First, 
the General Assembly could have asked voters to allow the legislature to set property 
taxes for school finance.  Second, the General Assembly could have asked voters to 
restore the floating mill levy for schools within certain limits.  Third, the General 
Assembly could have asked voters to make the constitutional school finance provisions 
consistent by reducing the Amendment 23 requirement for one additional percentage or 
by increasing the TABOR limit to allow for the one additional percentage throughout FY 
2010-11.  Fourth, the General Assembly could have addressed the state’s biennial 
reassessment cycle in the context of TABOR’s annual limits by changing the cycle for 
reassessing property or by modifying the calculations of the limit to account for the two-
year’s worth of growth in values. 
 
5.3.4 Amendment 23 and State Fiscal Issues 
Legislative Council concluded, “Since Amendment 23’s passage, the economic 
downturn has resulted in a number of unanticipated consequences” (Legislative xi). 
Declining income taxes and revenues affected the General Fund’s ability to support the 
appropriation necessary to develop a substantial base in the State Education Fund, and 
reduced the cushion available in the State Education Fund to support mandatory funding 
increases.   The result was increased strain on the General Fund as it was used to support 
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Amendment 23’s rigid funding requirements.  Legislative Council suggested that the 
General Assembly could ask voters to increase revenue, either by raising taxes or further 
reducing taxpayer refunds, or lessening the spending requirements outlined in 
Amendment 23 (Legislative xii). 
 
5.4 Referendum C 
On April 18, 2005 the Colorado General Assembly approved HB 05-1194, more 
commonly called Referendum C, which was submitted to voters in the election of that the 
same year.  On November 1, 2005, voters consented to a five-year time-out from TABOR 
when they approved Referendum C.  The measure was approved by 52 percent of 
Colorado voters, while 50.7 percent of voters rejected Referendum D, the parallel 
measure to Referendum C which would have allowed the state to borrow up to $2.072 
billion for transportation projects, K-12 and higher education buildings, and local fire and 
police pension obligations (“Referendum C”). 
Referendum C has three major provisions.11 First, the measure allows the state to 
disregard the TABOR formula and spend or save all revenues collected from 2006-2010.  
Allowable uses for retained revenue include K-12 education, higher education, health 
care, police and firefighter pension plans, and Department of Transportation programs.  
Second, the measure eliminates the TABOR ratchet effect by using as the base for the 
TABOR formula in 2011 the fiscal year in which the state had the highest total revenues 
between 2006 and 2010, and stipulates that in future years the TABOR limit will be 
based on the prior year’s limit instead of actual revenues.   When state revenues fell 
between 2001-02 and 2002-03, the TABOR limit also fell, which ratcheted down 
11 C.R.S. §24-77-103.6. 
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prospective allowable revenue retention in future years.  When revenues began to 
increase in 2004, the TABOR ratchet had forced future state revenue limits down by over 
$1 billion annually.  Third, the State Controller is required to report on allowable revenue 
retention spending under Referendum C. 
As a result of Referendum C’s passage, the six percent appropriations limit will 
become the effective limit on state government growth.  Spending up to the six percent 
limit will likely continue in order to prevent reductions in General Fund spending for 
subsequent years.  Should income and sales tax revenues grow at a steady rate, General 
Fund revenues above the allowable six percent limit will be allocated to fund highways 
and capital construction. 
 
Summary 
During the recession, declining revenues, coupled with the TABOR ratchet-down 
effect, forced disproportionate budget cuts to state departments.  First, programs were 
prioritized.  Those programs constitutionally protected or deemed necessary for public 
safety were made a top priority.  Second, budgets for programs ranked lower in priority 
were wither reduced or terminated.  Third, cash funds were transferred to the General 
Fund in order to maintain state operations.  Ultimately, voters approved Referendum C, 
which provided a solution to the ratchet-down effect and significant revenue declines.   
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6. The Role of TABOR During the Recession 
6.1 TABOR and Public Services During the Recession 
TABOR had been popular during the economic expansion of the 1990s.  
However, sentiments changed when the recession hit in 2001 and critics focused on 
TABOR’s role in “the worst fiscal crisis in decades.” The key problem during the 
recession was declining revenues, which was compounded by the TABOR ratchet-down 
effect.  Although TABOR surpluses had disappeared and tax revenues continued to 
decline, state officials were required to make TABOR rebates for the prior fiscal year, 
while also reducing state spending levels.  TABOR proved to be a fiscal accelerator 
rather than a fiscal stabilizer, exacerbating the state’s financial difficulties (Hill et al.). 
Nobody thought this mattered when the constitutional amendment [TABOR] was enacted 
in 1992 because it seems natural for revenues to grow from one year to the next (Snell 
24). 
As revenues declined, Amendment 23 simultaneously required increases in state 
appropriations for K-12 education.  Although proponents of Amendment 23 had 
anticipated the requirement for increased funding being financed by TABOR surpluses, 
there were no surpluses (Snell 24).  And there was no escape clause either.  According to 
statute, Amendment 23’s provisions must be met, but TABOR prevented raising taxes or 
lifting Amendment 23’s requirements even temporarily without voter approval.   
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In short, TABOR and Amendment 23 served opposing sides of a fiscal vise that 
squeezed the state budget during the recession and impeded necessary adjustments for 
recessionary cycles.  During the 2003-2004 legislative session, alleviating accumulated 
pressure from the fiscal vise squeezing the state budget was the most urgent issue 
lawmakers’ faced (James and Wallis 16).  Ultimately, other areas of the budget were cut 
in order to fund mandatory increases in K-12 education.  Such cuts were concentrated in 
a few state programs, primarily higher education and social welfare programs (Poulson, 
“Colorado’s” 17). 
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, the TABOR 
amendment itself is only one strand of a tangle of Colorado constitutional and statutory 
provisions that have generated a constitutional dilemma.  Limits on revenue and spending 
and constitutional requirements for spending growth have created a structural deficit.  
TABOR, however, is the most important strand of the tangle (Snell 24). This position is 
aligned with much of the literature on Colorado’s TELs and the recession.   
Poulson notes, it is impossible to simultaneously achieve the desired ends of each 
of the fiscal provisions of the Colorado Constitution; some provisions require a ratcheting 
down of government revenue and spending, while others require a ratcheting up of 
spending.  To satisfy each of these provisions would require deficit spending during 
recessions, which is exactly when there is a revenue shortfall.  And, in the long run, the 
provisions build a structural deficit into the budget.  Constitutional provisions that require 
a balanced budget prohibit both outcomes (Poulson, “Colorado’s” 20). 
The authors of TABOR wanted to limit the growth of government in Colorado.  
In 1991, Colorado’s state and local taxes as a percentage of income ranked 25th according 
to The Tax Foundation.  In the decade following TABOR’s passage, Colorado fell on the 
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list to 47th.  TABOR has reduced, not merely maintained, the growth of Colorado’s 
government relative to the economy (“Flaws” 5).  In 2003, Colorado’s Fiscal Policy 
Institute asserted, “TABOR functions to limit government growth when robust revenues 
would normally enable it to catch up with a backlog of needs, and it ratchets down the 
base when revenues fall below an artificial and inappropriate formula.  In a modern 
society, this trend is unsustainable since state government is increasingly holding up an 
ever-growing part of the social and economic safety net in America (“Flaws” 5). 
While proponents of TABOR assert that it has functioned to reduce the size of 
government in Colorado, opponents question the impact TABOR has had on the state’s 
public services, especially during the recession.  Overall, opponents contend that TABOR 
adversely affected some of the state’s public services by magnifying the effects of the 
recession on the Colorado budget and forcing over $1 billion in cuts (e.g., Bradley and 
Lyons).  Significant cuts were made in the following areas: 
• Non-emergency Medicaid Transportation (cut by nearly 2/3), which left many 
Medicaid participants without transportation to and from medical care sites; 
• Medicaid services to legal immigrants, including pre-natal care; 
• Affordable housing loans and grants; 
• Low-income preschool slots were cut in half; 
• Aid to the Needy Disabled; and 
• Mental health services (“TABOR had” 3). 
Cuts to the six largest state departments were smaller relative to the cuts made for 
other departments.  Some of the departments experienced significant General Fund 
reductions, ranging from 20 percent up to 85 percent.  Between 2001 and 2003, total 
funding for seven departments grew faster than population and inflation, while all other 
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departments experienced cutbacks on a real, per capita basis (“State Budget” 9).  Some of 
the departments that lost General Funds were able to maintain services by switching to 
alternative funding sources, such as federal funding or cash funds.  Departments unable 
to take such a course of action were forced to reduce service levels.  Figure seven 
indicates how total state funds were appropriated to each department between FY 2000-
01 and FY 2004-05. 
 
Department % Change from 
FY 00-01 – FY 04-05 
% of Total Funding to 
Department  
State 94.8 0.2 
Education 34.3 24.8 
Local Affairs 32.3 1.3 
Public Safety 32.2 1.6 
Health Care Policy 31.3 21.8 
Personnel & Administration 19.6 1.3 
Corrections 15.5 4.0 
Judicial 12.3 2.1 
Natural Resources 10.4 1.3 
Military/Veterans Affairs 10.2 0.9 
Public Health & Environment 9.4 3.8 
Revenue 9.2 0.3 
Law 8.8 12.0 
Higher Education 8.6 1.0 
Regulatory Agencies 5.3 0.5 
Agriculture -.08 0.2 
Treasury  -2.8 1.9 
Governor -4.0 0.3 
Legislature -4.2 0.2 
Human Services -6.6 12.0 
Transportation -34.1 6.6 
 
Figure 7:  Departmental Appropriation Breakdown of All Funds (General, Cash 
Funds, Cash Funds Exempt, and Federal Funds) Between FY 2000-01 
and FY 2004-05. 
 
Source:  Colorado Fiscal Policy Institute, “State Budget Cuts, 2001-05,” 
November 2004, p. 5. 
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The six largest departments are, in order: Education; Health Care Policy and 
Financing; Higher Education; Corrections; Human Services; and Judicial.  These 
departments are caseload driven, and General Fund appropriations to them are based 
largely on their budgetary needs in meeting caseload demand.  Economic conditions, 
demographic factors, and constitutional, statutory, and federal requirements drive 
caseloads.  The Colorado Constitution mandates the provision of the public school 
system for all residents between ages 6 and 21.  Statutory criminal sentencing laws and 
parole requirements influence prison caseloads.  Numerous programs within the six major 
departments involve matching federal funds, and the receipt of federal funds typically 
entails a host of stipulations concerning the populations to be served.   
Economic conditions and population growth are also considerable caseload 
drivers.  Economic upswings are typically correlated with increased state revenues, 
population growth, and inflation, and these factors both increase costs to departments and 
expand caseloads.  During economic upswings, caseload growth is typically greater for 
the Dept. of Education, Dept. of Health Care Policy and Financing, Dept. of Human 
Services, Dept. of Corrections, and the Judicial Department.  A robust economy attracts 
people to the state, which increase K-12 enrollment and weigh on the Dept. of Education.  
Costs of medical services and supplies already persistently exceed the inflationary rate 
and continue to rise during economic upswings, which, in turn, increase costs overall to 
the Departments of Health Care Policy and Financing and Human Services.  Population 
growth during periods of economic prosperity is associated with increased case filings, 
which burden both the Dept. of Corrections and the Judicial Dept. 
Economic downturns are typically correlated with decreased state revenues, 
population decline, and inflation, and caseload growth typically expands as people are 
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adversely impacted by the characteristics of a slowing economy.  More specifically, 
during such periods, caseload growth is typically greater for the Departments of Higher 
Education, Health Care Policy and Financing, and Corrections and Judicial: more people 
enroll in higher education when job availability decreases, which increases costs for the 
Dept. of Higher Education; more people become indigent during downturns, which drives 
Medicaid caseloads for the Dept. of Health Care Policy and Financing; and increased 
crime levels during downturns drives caseloads for the Departments of Corrections and 
Judicial. 
The assessment of TABOR, Amendment 23, the Gallagher Amendment, and 
other Fiscal Issues prepared by Colorado Legislative Council outlines a number of ways 
in which TABOR influenced funding for departments during the recession.  First, 
regarding Gallagher and TABOR, the report indicates that the combination of the 
Gallagher amendment and TABOR effectively placed the burden of increased funding for 
K-12 education on the state.  TABOR precludes raising the mill levy without voter 
approval, and the slow growth in property tax revenue made supplemental state funds 
compulsory.  TABOR limited allowable tax revenue quantities school districts could 
receive, which further shifted the funding burden to the state.  The heightened funding 
burden for K-12 education reduced funding available overall for the departments 
(Legislative 10 of Appendix B).  
Second, the report considers caseload growth for departments and the role of 
TABOR.  For example, caseloads and probationers significantly drive Judicial 
Department expenditures.  Should growth in caseloads and probationers exceed 
population growth (assuming inflation affects the department and the state the same), 
department expenditures may be greater than the TABOR limit, which pressures the 
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General Assembly because the TABOR limit imposes a ceiling on revenues overall 
(Legislative 44 of Appendix B).   Similarly, the number of prisoners and the costs of 
imprisonment determine expenditures for the Dept. of Corrections.  If prison population 
growth exceeds the state’s general population growth, department expenditures may be 
greater than the TABOR limit, which puts pressure on other areas of the budget and other 
departments reliant on General Funds.  This was the scenario during the recession.  
Funding for the Dept. of Corrections did increase considerably during the recession and 
resulted in funding decreases in other areas of the budget.  In every fiscal year since FY 
1989-90, growth in the Colorado prison population has been greater than that of the 
general population. 
  
6.2 The Case of State Mental Health Services During the Recession 
The Colorado Department of Human Services (DHS) is responsible for the 
provision of non-medical public assistance and welfare services.  DHS programs include: 
cash and food assistance, child support enforcement, child welfare, rehabilitation 
services, veterans services, alcohol and drug treatment, services for the aging, care for the 
mentally ill, developmentally, disabled, and juvenile offenders.  Colorado’s Mental 
Health system, which is administered by the Division of Mental Health, a division within 
the Colorado Department of Health and Human Services Office of Behavioral Health, 
provides essential services to some of the state’s most vulnerable citizens.  Mental health 
patients rely on treatments, which are often crucial in order to prevent the infliction of 
harm to patients themselves or to others.   
In order to provide the bulk of its services, the division contracts with mental 
health centers throughout the state.  The most serious cases are serviced at two Colorado 
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Mental Health Institutes located in Pueblo and Fort Logan.  There are 17 community 
mental health centers and six specialty mental health clinics with which the DHS 
contracts.  Funding for the community mental health program is made up of state funds 
matched by Federal Medicaid funds at a rate of about 50 percent.  Between FY 1990-91 
and FY 1996-97, General Fund appropriations to the community mental health system 
increased at an average annual rate of 5.6 percent, from $31.9 million to $46.7 million.  
Funding increased significantly in FY 1998-99 with implementation of the Medicaid 
Mental Health Capitation program.  While General Fund allocation to the department 
increased for the following five years at a rate of 3.3 percent, it decreased due to the 
revenue shortfall.   
 The Medicaid Mental Health Capitation program is a managed mental health care 
system that is funded mainly by Medicaid.  The program covers eight regions within 
Colorado, and the management of the program is carried out by individual organizations 
in each region, known as Mental Health Assessment Services Agencies (MHASA).  The 
state pays each MHASA a monthly flat fee per Medicaid patient enrolled, and most 
Medicaid patients in Colorado are enrolled in the program.   Program funding is largely 
determined by Medicaid eligibility, which increased 9.5 percent between FY 1998-90 and 
FY 2003-04 (Legislative 36 of Appendix B). 
 Mental health institutes are charged with providing care to patients who have 
very serious mental illnesses.  Institutes received annual General Fund appropriation 
increases at a rate of 1.4 percent (from $52.3 million to $62.5 million) between FY 1990-
91 and FY 2003-04, while Medicaid funding decreased from $13.3 million to $3.3 
million during the same period (Legislative 36 of Appendix B). 
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Colorado’s broader mental health system suffered funding cuts during the 
recession, which led to treatment reductions.  In a February 2005 report entitled, “An 
Analysis of Recent Trends in Colorado’s Mental Health System,” the Division of Mental 
Health acknowledges that the recession forced departmental budget cuts, outlines how the 
budget cuts were made, and presents the following key findings: 
• The number of Medicaid eligible persons receiving services declined; 
• 16,378 fewer persons were reported served from FY 2001 to FY 2004.  Although 
11,195 fewer non-Medicaid persons were served, there were also 5,183 fewer 
Medicaid individuals reported served in spite of increases in Medicaid eligibility 
over that period; 
• The public mental health system no longer reported serving an equal number of 
non-Medicaid persons.  10,461 fewer non-Medicaid than Medicaid persons were 
reported served in FY 2004, which is a reversal of FY 2001 when 878 more non-
Medicaid persons were reported served; 
• Non-Medicaid federal and State General Funds shrank as a percentage of total, 
reported revenue from 19.1 in FY 2002 to 16.8 in FY 2004; and   
• The average funding per Medicaid eligible declined 24.7 percent from FY 2002 
to FY 2004; 
• The level of severity of those reported served increased from FY 2001 to FY 
2004.  Cases of children and adolescents with serious emotional disturbances 
increased from 64.76 percent in FY 2001 to 74.20 percent in FY 2004.  At the 
same time, the percentage of adults with serious and persistent mental illnesses 
increased 6.68 percent; and 
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• Two-thirds of all units of service reported were delivered to Medicaid persons in 
FY 2004.  In FY 2001, 48 percent of all units of services reported were delivered 
to Medicaid persons (2-3). 
In outlining how the budget cuts were made, the February 2005 report (2-19) 
indicates that between FY 2002 and FY 2003, the total quantity of General Fund dollars 
apportioned for the provision of services to adults and children with serious mental 
illnesses was reduced from $18,777,197 to $15,671,434, a decrease of 16.54 percent.  
Between FY 2003 and FY 2004, General Funds were reduced by $1,601,635, a decrease 
of 10.22 percent.  In sum, between FY 2002 and FY 2004, total General Funds were 
decreased by $4,707,398, which represents a total decrease of 25.06 percent.  During this 
period, the number of long-term care beds in the state’s two mental health institutes was 
also reduced.  The Fort Logan Mental Health Institute reduced residential unit beds by 16 
beds, adult unit beds by 27, and eliminated an after-care treatment program.  Pueblo 
Mental Health reduced adolescent unit beds by eight and adult unit beds by 27. 
Between FY 2002 and FY 2004, the total quantity of General Fund dollars 
apportioned to the Medicaid Mental Health Capitation program were also reduced, even 
though the number of caseloads increased during this period.  In FY 2002, the program 
received $184,906,860 in General Fund dollars.  In FY 2003, General Fund dollars 
appropriated for the program decreased to $144,704,276.  In FY 2004, General Fund 
dollars did increase, but only by 1.72 percent.  Between 2002 and 2004, the total number 
of eligibles (caseloads) grew by 30.58 percent, while funding per eligible decreased by 
24.73 percent during this period (“An Analysis” 3-4). 
 Between 2001 and 2004, General Funds were reduced by over 10 percent for 
alcohol and drug abuse programs, which relates to mental illness since mental illness and 
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substance abuse are correlated.  Some mental health and drug abuse programs were 
eliminated altogether including the: 
• Early Intervention Program; 
• Mental Health Treatment Program for Detained Youth; 
• Early Childhood Mental Health Program; and 
• Community Mental Health Programs for uninsured, non-Medicaid clients 
(“TABOR Issue”). 
During the same period, funding for mental health services in all state detention 
facilities was eliminated, which included funding for a secure juvenile.  The Bell Policy 
center reported that, “At a time when state budget cuts have eliminated many treatment 
programs for juvenile delinquents, the Colorado Division of Youth Corrections recently 
reported that 24 percent of all juveniles in the justice system have been diagnosed with a 
serious mental illness facility” (“TABOR Issue”). 
According to David Iverson, M.D., former Chair of Governor Owens’ Advisory 
Board for Mental Health and the Law, described the effects of TABOR on the public 
mental health system, “The TABOR ratchet effect has squeezed a mental health system 
that was already struggling to the point where it is no system at all. The problems 
outlined are the result of a sick system that without any doubt has been significantly 
eroded by the effects of TABOR and the budget crisis.  The social safety net and the 
social contract are in tatters” (191). 
 
6.3 The Case of Higher Education During the Recession 
The Department of Higher Education also faced serious budget complications 
during the recession.  Higher education funding was reduced by 22 percent between 2002 
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and 2005, while tuition increased 30 percent during the same years.  A former President 
of the University of Colorado noted in 2004, “Public higher education is at a critical 
juncture.  A combination of recent budget cuts and increasing costs has put all of our 
budgets in serious jeopardy…there is a very real threat that Colorado will not be able to 
provide any public funding for higher education by the end of this decade” (Hoffmann).  
According to a Rocky Mountain News article, in 2008, state appropriations for some 
colleges – including the University of Colorado, Colorado State University, and the 
University of Northern Colorado – are still below pre-recession levels because the six 
percent limit prevented legislators from ramping up spending when the recession ended” 
(Morson A1). 
 
 The Dept. of Higher Education provides educational opportunities for Colorado 
residents through a system of 26 state campuses, two district junior colleges, and four 
vocational schools.  While traditionally funding for the department has been primarily 
from General Funds and tuition payments, in FY 2002-03 cash funds and increased 
tuition rates served as primary revenue sources.  Enrollment growth, inflation, 
performance measures, and tuition are the main factors that drive higher education 
expenditures.  Even low levels of student enrollment increases can drive great need for 
General Funds, and, like many other departments, higher education needs base funding 
increases each year just to keep pace with rising costs.   
 During the recession, areas of the budget that lacked constitutionally mandated 
funding increases, areas that were not matched with federal funds, such as Medicaid, and 
areas that were not driven by statutes that mandate funding, such as criminal codes that 
mandate incarceration, were especially vulnerable to budget cuts.  Higher education is a 
prime example of this since it did not match these criteria.  Further, higher education 
 sustained a disproportionately larger General Fund reduction because it is generally 
considered a balancing mechanism of the budget, and it is perceived that higher education 
has the ability to generate new revenue through tuition increases (“Supporting” 3). 
Between FY 2002-03 and FY 2005-06, Colorado policymakers cut General Fund 
appropriations for higher education by $177.4 million (“Update”).  Figure eight indicates 
the share of the General Fund received by the Dept. of Higher Education between 1990 
and 2004.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: Change in the Share of General Fund Revenues Allocated to the 
Department of Higher Education. 
 
Source: Colorado State University, “Supporting Excellence: The Funding 
Challenge for Colorado Higher Education,” February 2004, p. 3. 
 
 While General Fund appropriations for higher education decreased, tuition rates 
increased.  However, tuition increases did not provide enough revenue to offset the 
decline in General Funds.  Figure eight outlines the state funding changes for higher 
education during the recession.  The Bell Policy Center explains: 
• Between 2001 and 2004, state funds for higher education declined 32 percent; 
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• In FY 2003-04, state fund appropriations for higher education reached their lowest 
level in over 20 years;  
• In 2004, Colorado ranked 45th nationally in providing an opportunity for low-income 
students to attend college and 47th in postsecondary enrollment rates for minority 
young adults (age 18-24); 
• In 2004, the Colorado Commission on Higher Education estimated that the state 
need-based financial aid programs covered less than 7 percent of student 
demonstrated financial need; and, 
• In 2004, Colorado ranked 48th nationally for state funds for higher education per 
$1,000 of personal income (“Colorado TABOR”). 
 
Year State Funds 
for Public 
Colleges 
% Change 
from Prior 
Year 
Funding per 
Colorado 
Student 
2000-01 $613 million 3.5 $5,228 
2001-02 $618 million 0.8 $5,062 
2002-03 $566 million -8.4 $4,330 
2003-04 $496 million -12.4 $3,632 
2004-05 $491 million -1.0 $3,545 
2005-06 $534 million 8.0 $3,918 
2006-07 $579 million 8.4 $4,337 
2007-08 $628 million 8.4 $4,640 
2008-09 $680 million 8.3 n/a 
 
Figure 9: Public Higher Education Funding Changes between FY 2000-01 and FY 
2008-09 
 
Source:  “Colorado Colleges in a Hole,” Rocky Mountain News, April 28, 2008 
 
 Historically, Colorado funding for higher education has not traditionally ranked 
highly relative to other states.  In 2002, cuts to higher education were $52 million, and 
cuts persisted until 2005.  Cuts to higher education were significant for two main reasons.  
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First, funding increases are not mandated constitutionally or statutorily. When revenues 
declined, higher education funding cuts were used offset funding increases elsewhere in 
the budget.  Second, TABOR and Colorado’s other limitations restricted revenue 
retention and governed spending decisions.   
While Referendum C helped the Department of Higher Education to overcome 
some of the financial setbacks it has incurred, additional resources are still needed.   
 
 
According to a Colorado State University report prepared in 2004 on higher 
education funding: 
 The decline in state support for Colorado colleges and universities is exacerbated by 
constitutional limitations, including TABOR.  Although perhaps unintended, tuition 
revenue, paid by students and parents to support a college education, is considered 
TABOR revenue, and it is therefore subject to the same restrictions as revenue derived 
from taxes…we must support innovative and creative programs that allow funding to 
follow students.  But such programs are not sustainable within the current constitutional 
limits placed on our state by the TABOR Amendment and other measures, since there 
will be no significant state General Fund left to invest in any form of public higher 
education (“Supporting”). 
 
Summary 
Although, voters approved TABOR as a measure to limit the growth of 
government, it has had unintended consequences that posed great difficulties during the 
recession.  First, the TABOR ratchet effect limited state revenues drastically and 
unexpectedly.  Second, TABOR interacted with the state’s other limitations in such a way 
that reduced options available to legislators in dealing with the recession.  Voter approval 
was required to lift any of the state’s limits, and while TABOR mandated taxpayer 
refunds, Amendment 23 mandated increased K-12 education spending.   
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General Fund revenues declined substantially during the recession, which forced 
budget cuts in order to maintain core state operations.  The budgets of fifteen state 
departments were reduced between FY 2000-01 and FY 2004-05.  Notably, budget cuts 
to the departments of Human Services and Higher Education were considerable.  Cuts to 
the state’s mental health system forced service reductions, and cuts to the higher 
education system forced tuition increases. 
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7. Conclusion 
Prior to the economic downturn, TEL proponents in other states held up 
Colorado as a model for the benefits of TEL enactment.  However, during the recession 
this changed and Colorado instead became a model for the potential complications these 
measures can pose for state governments.  
 Colorado’s TABOR Amendment was promoted as a simple way to restrain 
government growth, which appealed to Colorado’s tradition of anti-tax, anti-government 
sentiments.  Although Colorado’s TABOR law has functioned to reduce the size of 
government since it passed with a majority of votes, it had significant unintended 
consequences that became widely apparent when it compelled a budget squeeze that 
heavily impacted areas of the budget for which funding was not constitutionally or 
statutorily mandated.  Between 2001 and 2005, TABOR limited the options available to 
officials responding to the fiscal crisis, conflicted with the state’s other limitations, 
particularly Amendment 23, forced reductions in state services, and forced tuition 
increases.  The passage of Referendum C suggests a mismatch between voter preferences 
and TABOR’s unintended consequences.  Further, ambiguities in how TABOR refunds 
are to be made have allowed legislators to allocate surplus revenues in such a way as to 
benefit special interests which also constitutes an unintended consequence of the TABOR 
law. 
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